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Informal Taxation in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone: Taxpayers’ Experiences and 
Perceptions 
 
Samuel Jibao, Wilson Prichard and Vanessa van den Boogaard  
 
 
Summary 
 
In low-income and post-conflict countries, and particularly in rural areas, citizens often pay a 
range of ‘taxes’ that differ substantially from statutory policies. These ‘informal taxes’, paid to a 
variety of state and non-state actors, are frequently overlooked in analyses of local systems of 
taxation. This is problematic as it leads to misunderstandings of individual and household tax 
burdens, as well as of systems of local governance. This study thus seeks to capture the reality 
of taxation in peripheral areas of Sierra Leone. It is based on a taxpayer survey covering 1,129 
heads of households, in-depth interviews with government and chiefdom officials, and focus 
group discussions with community stakeholders across three rural districts of Sierra Leone. We 
describe the variety, extent, magnitude, and enforcement mechanisms associated with different 
types of taxes, finding that non-state informal revenue collection is highly prevalent, representing 
a significant proportion of taxes paid by individuals. Exploring taxpayer perceptions of the 
different types of taxes, we find positive perceptions of payments levied by non-state actors 
relative to those levied by local and central governments in terms of fairness, transparency, 
accountability, and service provision. We conclude by considering the implications of these 
findings, particularly in the context of on-going fiscal decentralisation reforms in Sierra Leone.   
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Introduction  
 
In low-income and post-conflict countries, and particularly in rural areas, citizens pay ‘taxes’ that 
often differ substantially from statutory policies. These ‘informal taxes’ are frequently overlooked 
in policy and in conventional academic analyses of local systems of taxation and public service 
delivery. This is problematic: focusing only on ‘formal’ state taxation can lead to a 
misunderstanding not just of local tax burdens and public goods provision, but also of local 
governance more broadly. It is accordingly necessary to examine how both formal and informal 
taxes are distributed, collected and perceived by citizens in rural areas of low-income, post-
conflict countries in order to capture ‘real’ rather than ‘idealised’ systems of tax and governance 
(Cleaver, Franks, Maganga and Hall 2013; Booth 2011 and 2012; Olken and Singhal 2011).   
 
We direct our attention to this under-researched area in rural and conflict-affected areas of 
Sierra Leone, capturing the prevalence and nature of informal taxes and levies and exploring 
taxpayer perceptions of informal taxation relative to formal, statutory taxes. We define informal 
taxes and levies as all non-statutory payments made to state or non-state actors as the result of 
the exercise of political, coercive or social power. In contrast to public finance terminology, we 
have intentionally kept this definition broad, in order to capture the wide range of tax-like 
payments often made by citizens in rural areas, making further distinctions between illegal state 
levies, informal chiefdom taxes and user fees, and non-state levies and user fees for collective 
services. Illegal state levies include a range of bribes, extortions and goodwill payments 
(Prud’homme 1992),1 while non-state and chiefdom levies and user fees may take a variety of 
forms, including various types of community levies, with payments made to community groups 
providing publicly available services or goods. These payments, often deeply institutionalised 
within communities, may be levied by self-help groups, traditional authorities, or other local 
governing structures (e.g. Olken and Singhal 2011; Rao 2005; Brick 2008; Thomas 1987). At the 
same time, non-state levies may take more obviously exploitative forms. For example, insurgent 
groups, warlords or vigilante groups may extort cash and resources from citizens in exchange 
for security, amounting to ‘protection payments’, which is a focus of the informal tax scholarship 
in fragile or conflict-affected contexts (e.g. Buchanan-Smith, Fadul, Tahir and Aklilu 2012; Haver 
2009; Titeca 2011; Holterman 2010; Raeymaekers 2010 and 2013; Menkhaus 2008; LeBas 
2013; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). This definition includes both payments for general 
sources (e.g. taxes) and for specific sources (e.g. user fees). Though fees, licences and other 
charges are not viewed traditionally as ‘taxes’, they are both a vital part of local government 
income (e.g. Devas 2011), and necessary to consider in terms of overall household tax burdens. 
More basically, we are less concerned with the distinctions between tax, user fees and other 
distinctions (e.g. bribes, extortion) than with the impacts of the overall payments made by 
citizens in rural areas. 
 
However, while there is a growing recognition that these informal taxes and levies are a critical 
aspect of local governance, research has yet to systematically capture what informal taxes 
people pay, how those taxes are collected, how they are perceived, and how these things vary 
across different groups of individuals and different locations. We fill these gaps with a survey of 
1,129 households in 86 primary sampling units across nine chiefdoms in three rural and highly 
conflict-affected districts in Sierra Leone. We provide a comprehensive overview of the formal 
and informal taxes paid by rural citizens, capturing taxpayer perceptions of the different tax types 
                                                        
1  Despite making this distinction between state and non-state actors, we recognise that in certain contexts manifestations of 
power may blur the line between state and non-state taxing authorities, as with ‘militarized civil administration’ and 
‘civilianized military personnel’ at the Cameroonian-Chadian border (Roitman 2007; see also Roitman 2005 and Schomerus 
and Titeca 2012).  
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and taxing authorities. We complement the survey data with qualitative data from in-depth 
interviews with key local government officials and focus group discussions with taxpayers and 
key community stakeholders in each of the nine case chiefdoms. We find that informal taxes and 
levies, particularly those levied by non-state community-based groups and chiefdom authorities, 
are a prevalent and often institutionalised reality within rural Sierra Leone. Moreover, we find 
that informal non-state and chiefdom levies are consistently perceived more positively than taxes 
levied by the central or local state across a wide range of indicators, including fairness, 
reciprocity and accountability. However, while informal chiefdom levies are perceived more 
positively than formal state taxes, taxpayers also perceive them to be relatively unaccountable 
and lacking in transparency. These findings have profound implications for how we think about 
taxation, governance, and possible directions for administrative reform in rural areas of the 
country.  
 
This paper begins with an overview of the growing literature in this field. Section 2 outlines the 
methodological design of our research, while Section 3 provides a brief overview of the 
decentralised system of governance in Sierra Leone. Section 4 provides an overview of the 
reported prevalence of formal and informal taxation, while Section 5 compares citizen 
perceptions of formal state taxes, illegal state levies, informal chiefdom taxes and user fees, and 
informal non-state levies and user fees. Section 6 summarises the key findings and discusses 
the implications of these findings for local government revenue reform, governance and service 
delivery in rural and conflict-affected areas of Sierra Leone. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
1  Literature review 
 
Conventional analyses of tax systems often assume that taxation does not affect citizens in low-
income countries at the local level, particularly in rural areas (Gemmell and Morrissey 2005). 
However, this perspective fails to capture a significant proportion of the payments made by 
taxpayers in local and rural settings, and thus provides an incomplete understanding of taxation 
and governance in low-income countries and the impacts that these systems have on citizen 
livelihoods. Indeed, a growing body of literature demonstrates that a narrow focus on formal 
taxation – that is, taxes statutorily levied by government representatives – captures only the 
‘idealised’ rather than the ‘real’ tax system. By contrast, informal taxation – non-statutory levies 
by state or non-state actors – is prevalent within many low-income countries, with total informal 
tax payments often larger than formal tax payments made by individuals, households, and small 
businesses (Ogra and Kundu 2011; Tegera and Johnson 2007; Suharto 2011; Juul 2006; Rao 
2005). While the literature in this field is somewhat scattered, and based on evidence that is 
frequently either anecdotal or limited in geographic scope, it suggests several key features of 
informal taxation. 
 
First, while evidence shows that wealthier households generally contribute a greater amount of 
labour or income towards informally taxed community projects (Beard 2007; Olken and Singhal 
2011; Thomas 1987), informal taxes, as with local-level taxes more broadly, are often 
overwhelmingly regressive as share of income (Olken and Singhal 2011; Van Damme 2012; for 
distribution of formal local government taxes see Carroll 2011; Bahiigwa, Ellis, Fjeldstad and 
Iversen 2004; Devas 2011).  
 
Second, informal taxation is often associated with coercive enforcement mechanisms 
(Schomerus and Titeca 2012; Titeca 2011; World Bank 2011), with taxpayer outcomes highly 
dependent on relations of political, coercive or social power between taxpayers and taxing 
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authorities. While coercive mechanisms, such as harassment, may have more obvious negative 
impacts on taxpayers, social enforcement mechanisms, including barring from communal 
resources or restriction from informal systems of livelihoods support, can have particularly 
severe economic consequences in rural settings (Olken and Singhal 2011; Thomas 1987; 
Ostrom 1991; Clark 2010; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Again, however, it may not be analytically 
useful to assess the enforcement mechanisms of informal taxation in isolation, as there is ample 
evidence that formal local government tax collection in sub-Saharan Africa is also often arbitrary 
and coercive (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008; Moore 2008; La Porta and Shleifer 2008).   
 
Third, while informal taxation is often associated with corruption or extortion, evidence suggests 
that in the absence of an effective or accountable state, informal revenue collection can finance 
essential public goods, such as roads, schools, water systems and teachers for community 
schools (Olken and Singhal 2011; Ostrom 1991; Rao 2005; Njoh 2003; Barkan, McNulty and 
Ayeni 1991; Thomas 1987; Wilson 1992; Mbithi and Rasmusson 1978; Hill 1991). In other 
instances, informal taxes are viewed as contributing to public goods and services simply by 
contributing to the low salaries received by public officials (Prud’homme 1992). Non-state armed 
taxing authorities may even become involved in public goods provision, as in certain cases 
where armed insurgents are reliant on local communities or business networks (Titeca 2011). 
For instance, during the Sierra Leonean civil war, the rebel movement itself was involved in 
taxation. Though often coercive, in some areas the insurgents made attempts to provide basic 
services; nevertheless, these services, including clinics and schools, largely concentrated on 
Revolutionary United Front fighters rather than civilians (Keen 2005: 40; Richards 1996). This 
caveat emphasises the critical need to avoid an overly romantic view of informal revenue 
collection, local institutions, and service delivery. 
 
Finally, informal taxation is often thought to be unaccountable to taxpayers, who may be coerced 
under the guise of ‘protection’, in the case of armed groups, or by ‘tradition’, in the case of chiefs 
or traditional authorities (Haver 2009). These power dynamics shape both the practical norms 
and the outcomes of informal revenue collection, which may thus serve to entrench existing 
inequalities (Titeca 2012; Tegera and Johnson 2007; Cleaver et al. 2013; Meagher 2013; 
Meagher and Lindell 2013; Schomerus and Titeca 2012; Titeca and de Herdt 2010; Buchanan-
Smith et al. 2012; Juul 2006; Beard 2007; Ngau 1987; Barkan and Holmquist 1989). At the same 
time, informal revenue collection may be more accountable to taxpayers by being better able to 
respond to local conditions and reflect the norms of local moral economies, including the right to 
subsistence and exemptions for vulnerable individuals or households (Scott 1976; Hyden 2006; 
Prud’homme 1992; Titeca and Kimanuka 2012; Titeca and de Herdt 2010; Tegera and Johnson 
2007). Moreover, certain observers argue that informal tax and governance systems include 
checks and balances to ensure accountability, while their legitimacy (and thus existence) is often 
dependent on citizen approval (Prud’homme 1992; Beard 2007; Clark 2010; Njoh 2003).  
 
While this literature is thus suggestive of several key features of informal taxation, the 
incompleteness of available data has left several questions largely unanswered. Most accounts 
have been largely anecdotal, while the large-scale taxpayer surveys that have taken place have 
predominately been limited to informal tax practices specifically related to cross-border trade. 
This method of analysis captures many contrasting experiences of informal revenue collection, 
given its diversity, but fails to provide an overall view of taxation or to systematically capture 
variation within the category of ‘informal tax’. Moreover, most accounts have focused on either 
formal or informal taxes, preventing meaningful comparison between formal and informal tax and 
service delivery systems. Most basically, the literature provides sharply contrasting views of 
informal revenue collection ranging from positive assessments of local service delivery to 
overwhelming negative perspectives on the lack of accountability of informal tax systems. This 
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leaves us little in the way of thinking about local governance reform. Addressing these key gaps, 
we thus implement a survey with broad coverage, including both formal and informal taxes, in 
order to capture these alternative possibilities more systematically and to capture variation within 
informal tax. In so doing, we provide an encompassing view of the empirical reality of tax and 
service delivery in rural Sierra Leone.  
 
 
2  Research methods 
 
We employed a mixed methods research design, involving a household survey, qualitative in-
depth interviews, and focus group discussions. The research was conducted throughout 
November and December 2013. The core of the research is based on 1,129 household surveys, 
conducted in 86 primary sampling units across nine chiefdoms in three districts (See Figure 1). 
In-depth interviews with District Assembly officials were held in each district headquarter town, 
as well as with chiefdom staff, governing authorities, and local stakeholders in each chiefdom 
headquarter town. In each chiefdom headquarter town, focus group discussions were held, 
representing a cross-section of community interests. 
 
Figure 1 Map with highlighted case chiefdoms and districts 
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Our purposively selected case districts – Koinadugu in the far northeast of the country, Kono on 
the eastern border with Guinea, and Kailahun on the eastern border with Guinea and Liberia – 
were heavily conflict-affected during the civil war from 1991 to 2002, and represent some of the 
most rural and isolated areas of the country. We expect informal taxation to be more prominent 
in these areas, while we also expect these areas to be very different from urban centres and the 
western region of the country near Freetown in terms of economic activities and structures, 
governance systems, and the relative importance of chiefs in local government tax collection. 
Sub-district chiefdoms (Kasunko, Mongo, Sulima, Gbense, Kamara, Gbane, Upper Bambara, 
Mandu, and Luawa), sub-chiefdom sections and primary sampling units were selected according 
to a clustered, multi-stage probabilistic random sample design. As far as possible, random 
sampling was conducted with probability of selection proportionate to size. The resulting sample 
is representative at the chiefdom and district levels. Households within each primary sampling 
unit were systematically randomly selected according to a structured walking pattern, with the 
economically-active head of household selected within each household, with female heads of 
household representing 39 per cent of the total sample. In line with other major household 
surveys conducted in Sierra Leone, we defined a household as a person or group of persons 
related or unrelated who make common cooking arrangements (GoRSL 2007; Afrobarometer 
2011).  
 
 
3  Background: The decentralised Sierra 
Leonean state 
 
The Sierra Leonean state is built around the British system of indirect rule set up in 1896, which 
delegated local governance to traditional rulers. Though the colonial authority interfered with this 
tradition to a large extent (Reno 1995; Mamdani 1996), paramount chiefs and their subordinates 
(i.e. village and section chiefs) became responsible for collecting poll taxes and administering 
justice at the local level (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2013; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
The power of the paramount chiefs persisted even after the British created district councils in 
1945 as a counterweight to the chieftaincy. Despite the official jurisdiction of the local councils, 
the chiefs quickly came to dominate local governance and remained responsible for collecting 
local tax, though they were expected to provide a share of the tax (a ‘precept’) to the local 
councils. This highly ineffective system was abolished in 1972 by the post-independence 
government of Siaka Stevens. Formal power was centralised while de facto local power returned 
to the increasingly politicised chiefdoms, with the Stevens administration effectively using the 
same institutions of indirect rule to govern the countryside and mobilise political support, with 
chiefs as the primary conduit through which the government interacted with the people 
(Acemoglu et al. 2013b; Tangri 1978; Reed and Robinson 2012). Accordingly, and unlike 
elsewhere on the continent, the powers chiefs had acquired during the colonial period were 
further institutionalised in the post-independence period, in a process Fanthorpe (2001) 
describes as ‘colonial ossification’.  
 
It has been widely suggested that the centralisation of power at the national level, the resultant 
deterioration in the provision of local services, and politicisation of chieftaincy institutions were 
important causes of the brutal civil war that ran from 1991 to 2002 (Jackson 2005; Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004; Fanthorpe 2005; Sawyer 2008; Kanu 2009; 
Richards 1996). Accordingly, launching an ambitious decentralisation process was an immediate 
priority for the government and donors alike after the elections of 2002. The donor-sponsored 
Local Government Act of 2004 defined the legal framework for decentralisation, putting in place 
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five city councils, one municipal council and 13 district councils, the latter of which covered the 
bulk of the country and were further divided into 149 chiefdoms. The chiefdoms, though not 
recognised as a formal level of government, continue to exercise a significant degree of power in 
practice (Reed and Robinson 2012; Casey 2007; Robinson 2008; Jibao and Prichard 2013). The 
collection of taxes is carried out in partnership with the chiefdom councils within each district, 
with chiefdoms retaining the right to collect the local tax and market dues within their jurisdictions 
and then remit a share of those taxes to the district council. Of the revenues thus collected, the 
chiefdoms are expected to remit 40 per cent of local tax receipts and 20 per cent of market dues 
to the district councils, though this system is at present subject to extremely weak oversight 
(Prichard and Jibao 2010; Fanthorpe 2004).2  
 
This historical legacy has led to three outcomes that are significant to understanding tax 
collection in rural areas. First, and central to our analysis, this decentralisation agenda has 
placed the focus back on formal authorities, though this renewed focus on the ‘formal’ may be 
obscuring the persistence of the ‘informal’. Second, the system of shared authority has fostered 
conflicts between district councils and chiefdom authorities, including disagreement over the 
appropriate level of the precept and frequent failures by chiefdoms to remit this revenue to local 
councils (Prichard and Jibao 2010; Jibao and Prichard 2013). Third, the weakness of local level 
governance over a protracted period enabled informal forms of taxation to flourish, both as a 
means of self-help and through semi-exploitative forms of extraction. As Fanthorpe, Lavali and 
Gibril Sesay (2011: 5) explain, ‘Rural people have become used over generations to surviving 
with little or no government assistance and that isolation has helped to dampen demand for 
services. A local culture of ‘self-help’ remains strong … [with] an entrenched assumption in rural 
areas that welfare and services are as likely to come from benevolent patrons as from public 
institutions.’ We explore these possibilities through a comprehensive overview of taxation as 
experienced by rural taxpayers.  
 
 
4  Formal and informal taxation in rural Sierra 
Leone 
 
We first provide a comprehensive overview of tax payment data as reported by taxpayers. The 
taxes about which we inquired are summarised in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2  The proportion of this remittance depends on the size of the chiefdom. Class A chiefdoms are required to remit 20 per cent 
of revenues to the district council, Class B chiefdoms are required to remit 10 per cent of revenues, and Class C1 and C2 
chiefdoms are required to remit 5 per cent of revenues to the council.  
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Table 1 Overview of taxes investigated 
Formal state taxes and user 
fees 
Illegal state levies Informal chiefdom 
taxes and user fees 
Informal non-state community levies 
and user fees 
 
Central government taxes 
 Income tax, sales tax, 
company tax,* forestry tax,* 
land tax,* capital gains tax,* 
other taxes* 
 
Local government taxes and user 
fees3 
 Business licences, market 
fees, local (poll) tax, 
property tax, mining tax, 
other taxes (e.g. jetty 
handling fees, 
court/marriage fees, 
business registration fees, 
mining licences, surface 
rent) 
 User fees to 
schools/clinics/water 
 
Central government 
informal taxes 
 Informal taxes to 
central 
government 
employees 
 
Local government 
informal taxes 
 Informal taxes to 
local government, 
possibly paid 
through the chief 
 
Security payments 
 Informal taxes to 
army/police  
 
Informal taxes to the 
chief 
 Taxes/payments 
to chief (e.g. 
local materials/ 
payments for 
community 
projects, dispute 
resolution 
fees/fines, court 
fees) 
 Labour services 
to chief 
 
Community development taxes 
 User fees or community 
development taxes paid to 
religious organisations, local 
elites, community-based 
organisations (CBOs), or 
international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs)* 
 Informal payments to 
doctors/teachers, ‘community 
teacher’ fees 
 
Community governance taxes 
 Payments/fines to secret societies 
and trade associations 
 
Security/ protection payments 
 Payments to local security 
groups/neighbourhood watch 
organisations or local gangs* 
 
Note: Items with an asterisk (*) have a reported prevalence of less than 1.1 per cent of the sample and are thus not included in 
subsequent graphs of prevalence, though they are captured in subsequent analysis, where significance is weighted according to the 
size of the taxpaying sample sub-set. 
 
Overall, we find a wide range of actors engaged in revenue mobilisation and service provision, 
with widespread prevalence of informal revenue collection and informal tax practices, including a 
high degree of institutionalisation of non-state service delivery and governance mechanisms. As 
described in Table 2, economically-active heads of households reported having paid on average 
4.27 different taxes to state and non-state actors in the previous year, at an average expense of 
366,982.60 Sierra Leonean leones (Le) (US$84.77),  
equivalent to 10.21 per cent of estimated average 
income. While these estimates are conservative as they 
only capture the taxes paid by economically-active 
heads of household (rather than by all adult household 
members), we nevertheless find that respondents 
reported having paid a greater number of informal taxes 
and levies than formal taxes in the previous year, with 
almost half of all taxes paid being non-statutory 
payments made to a chief or non-state actor (Table 2, 
Figure 2). Moreover, while formal tax payments are 
greater than informal tax payments it is notable that 
more than a third of total tax payments went to the chief 
or non-state actors. We now provide a brief overview of 
each of the four types of tax: formal state taxes and 
user fees, illegal state levies, informal chiefdom taxes 
and user fees, and informal non-state levies and user fees. 
                                                        
3  A common, though variable, phenomenon within our case chiefdoms is chiefs that collect revenues on behalf of the local 
government (though not the central government), essentially serving as tax farmers, expected to remit a varying proportion 
of the revenues to the local government. However, we commonly found that these expected revenues are not necessarily 
remitted in part or full to the local government, though with considerable variance across chiefdoms. For the purposes of this 
study, payments made to chiefs on behalf of local government are included as state formal taxation, even though these 
revenues are not necessarily remitted to the local government. This distinction will be further explored by extensive 
qualitative follow-up research that is planned in the case chiefdoms.  
Formal taxes
and user fees
to state actors
Illegal state
levies
Informal
chiefdom taxes
and user fees
Informal non-
state levies
and user fees
Figure 2 Mean proportion of tax 
payments per household per 
annum, by taxing authority 
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Table 2 Number and amount of taxes paid by head of household in previous year, 
disaggregated by tax type 
 Formal state 
taxes and user 
fees 
Illegal state 
levies 
Informal 
chiefdom 
taxes and 
user fees 
Informal non-
state levies 
and user fees 
Mean number of taxes paid  
N 1129 
2.03 
 
0.24 
 
0.51 
 
1.50 
 
Average annual tax payment  (Le) 
N 1055 
221,829.70 
(US$51.24) 
 
10,503.89 
(US$2.43) 
5085.31 
(US$1.17) 
 
129,563.70 
(US$29.93) 
Average annual tax expenditure as proportion of 
estimated total tax payment 
60.46% 2.86% 1.39% 35.31% 
Average annual tax payment as proportion of 
estimated household annual income 
6.17% 2.92% 1.42% 3.61% 
 
Note: Due to the difficulty of estimating the equivalent cash value of labour in rural communities with differing and dynamic wage 
rates, the value of labour payments to chiefs has been excluded for this stage of this on-going research. 
 
First, though the vast majority of revenue in Sierra Leone is collected by the central government, 
with local government revenue collection amounting to less than 2 per cent of the national total 
in 2010 (Jibao and Prichard 2013; Prichard and Jibao 2010), we find that only 9.83 per cent of 
respondents pay any sort of tax to the central government. However, we find that 93.18 per cent 
of respondents report paying at least one form of formal local government tax, while 53.94 per 
cent report paying user fees to the local council for schools or clinics. The most important type of 
local government tax is the local (poll) tax, levied at a rate of Le 5000 (US$1.16) annually for 
every adult, with other taxes including property rate, business licences, mining revenues and 
market dues, which are set at a rate of Le 100 to 1000 (US$0.02 to 0.23) a day, depending on 
the chiefdom and the amount of goods being sold. As noted, chiefs collect several types of taxes 
on behalf of district councils, with chiefs expected to remit a proportion of the revenues to the 
district council. Within our case districts, district officials accused paramount chiefs of not 
remitting precepts to the council; for their part, chiefdom authorities argued that the little revenue 
they collect is insufficient to cover chiefdom administration salaries.4   
 
Given the chiefs’ power in local government tax collection, and the underlying tensions between 
chiefs and local councils, it is notable that property taxes are hardly collected at all, despite 
recent local government campaigns to introduce collection within our case districts.5 While the 
councils are responsible for property tax collection, paramount chiefs have often taken direct 
public stances against property taxation, refusing to encourage taxpayers within their chiefdom 
to the pay the rate and refusing to pay their own property taxes, with lower-level chiefs and other 
community members often proceeding to mimic these positions.6 For instance, the Paramount 
Chief of Kamara has refused to pay his property tax, as well as refusing to support the district 
council in collecting within his chiefdom, fostering what he described as ‘a small tax revolt – 
something like the Hut Tax War’.7 It is unsurprising that chiefdom subjects accordingly follow suit 
                                                        
4  Chiefdom administration salaries (i.e. for the chiefdom court chairman and chiefdom police, the security-cum-bailiff force 
attached to the local courts) are supposed to be paid from the amount of tax retained by the chiefdom. Paramount chiefs 
receive salaries from the central government, though these disbursements are often beset by long delays. Authors’ 
interviews with paramount, section and town chiefs in Gbane Chiefdom, Treasury Clerk and a Town Chief in Mandu 
Chiefdom, Treasury Clerk of Mongo Chiefdom, Kailahun District Council Chairman, Chiefdom Deputy Administrator of 
Koinadugu District, and Kono District Council Chairman. 
5  In many areas the district council has only completed the valuation and sensitisation phases of property rate introduction. 
Nevertheless, in these areas, taxpayers were often already resistant to the tax, stating their intention to evade it.   
6  Authors’ focus group discussion in Sulima Chiefdom and interviews with paramount, town chiefs and Mammy Queens 
(elected female leaders within chiefdoms) in Sulima, Kamara, Gbense and Mandu chiefdoms. 
7  In 1886, Governor Cardew unilaterally declared a Protectorate over the interior of the country, assessing a house/hut tax in 
1898. This tax sparked the violent ‘Hut Tax Rebellion’ led by Bai Bureh of Bureh Chiefdom, with support from other 
prominent chiefs.  
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to avoid appearing troublesome: reflecting wider public sentiment, one of the town chiefs 
described the paying of the property rate as a ‘community business’, saying, ‘I will only agree [to 
pay] if the PC [Paramount Chief] agrees.’8 
 
However, the extent of ‘formal’ taxation is overstated, as there is a significant degree of 
informality within otherwise formal tax transactions. Indeed, of those paying at least one of the 
aforementioned formal state taxes (N 1065), 38 per cent of households report paying at least 
one tax for which they never receive a receipt or for which the receipt they receive generally 
shows a different amount than the amount paid (Figure 3). This is a common indicator of 
informality within otherwise ‘formal’ tax transactions, indicating the possibility of tax rate 
negotiation (Titeca and Kimanuka 2012; Tegera and Johnson 2007).9 
 
Figure 3 Taxpayer experience of receiving accurate receipts for formal state taxes 
Second, more than a fifth of respondents (21 per cent) report paying at least one informal tax to 
the central or local government, with the most prevalent payments being made to army or police 
officers, often at roadblocks or checkpoints. Informal taxes to either the central or local 
government may represent ‘acceleration fees’, ‘goodwill’ payments or bribes in order to facilitate 
service, with the relatively low levels of payment in our districts likely reflecting the lack of 
contact the majority of taxpayers have with any form of government.10  
 
Third, a large share of respondents (43 per cent) report having made additional informal 
payments to local chiefs within the previous year, outside of the local government taxes 
collected by chiefs on behalf of district councils, including, commonly, local and market taxes. 
These informal chiefdom taxes include labour ‘taxes’ and the provision of local materials for 
community projects initiated by NGOs or other groups, a common requirement of externally-
funded projects, or for labour for community maintenance, such as road brushing.11 Chiefs often 
described having ‘youth on standby’, ready to be mobilised overnight to provide labour for such 
                                                        
8  A counter example was found in Luawa Chiefdom, where the district council has used a radio programme to create 
competition between sub-chiefdom sections. This has become a point of public pride or shame for sections, and has led 
section members to encourage others to pay by pointing to positive examples of the district council spending revenue within 
the chiefdom. However, even here the district council Chairman had ‘to promise chiefs incentives’ in order to gain their 
support.  
9  While this is a commonly used indicator, it may be a rather blunt one for particular taxes, such as sales tax, for which a 
receipt is generally not received by anyone in rural areas. Nevertheless, it indicates where there may be significant 
informality within formal state tax transactions.   
10  Indeed it is likely that ‘roadblock’ taxes to army or police officers are much higher in urban areas than is reflected within our 
survey of rural areas, as taxpayers in urban centres are more likely to have greater contact with military or police officers and 
are required to pass more frequent checkpoints or roadblocks in the course of trading or engaging in other business.  
11  While labour payments are excluded from the above estimates of the value of payments, payments made in cash, in kind, or 
in labour were included in the question posed to respondents about whether they had made any payments or contributions to 
a chief in the previous year.  
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projects.12 Meanwhile, in some areas chiefs continue to enjoy a ‘customary’ right to extract 
tribute and labour services from their subjects, which was previously enshrined in colonial law 
and which may be used to pull scarce labour towards a chief’s land during harvest season, 
rather than towards a communal project (Fanthorpe 2001; Fanthorpe et al. 2011; Acemoglu et al. 
2013b).13 In addition to these taxes, ‘anti-social behaviour’ is regulated by chiefdom bylaws and 
the Native Authority court system, with fees and fines levied for dispute resolution and 
penalisation (Baker 2008).14  
 
Fourth, the data reveals that payments to non-state actors are ubiquitous and substantial, with 
79 per cent of household heads reporting having paid at least one type of levy to a non-state 
actor within the previous year. These include fees to local trade associations, including 
associational enrolment fees (often Le 10,000, or US$2.31) as well as fines for not participating 
in rotational farm labour schemes. Secret societies, such as Poro and Sande, representing 
common gender-based forms of organisation for the regulation of moral conduct, may levy fees 
or fines on members for ceremonies, penalisation or dispute resolution. Moreover, it is common 
for religious organisations, community-based organisations or local influential individuals to levy 
community development taxes to fund certain projects, while taxes or fees may be paid to health 
staff or ‘community teachers’ – those not certified or on the government payroll, but who make 
up the vast majority of teachers within the nine case chiefdoms. A parents’ association or school 
management committee often organises payments to these community teachers, with parents 
agreeing to pay Le 3000 to 5000 (US$0.69 to 1.16) per child per term (dependent on the level of 
school), or in-kind contributions, such as cups of rice. In certain cases, students contribute 
labour to teachers’ farms. Informal payments to doctors may refer to fees to traditional healers or 
medicine men, or to the informal taxes or ‘small things’ requested by public clinics or peripheral 
health units, which can often be quite institutionalised, with commonly known rates set in leones 
(often Le 2000, or US$0.46) or in the form of in-kind contributions, such as agricultural 
products.15 In Upper Bambara Chiefdom this was described as a ‘barter system’, with nurses 
providing medication (often medication covered by the government’s free health-care 
programme for pregnant women, lactating mothers and children under five) and receiving 
foodstuffs in return.16  
 
Additionally, community members may collectively decide to levy user fees or other taxes to 
organise repairs of common goods. While many of these projects are initially funded by NGOs or 
international organisations, once projects are handed over to communities it is commonly 
expected that they be responsible for maintenance and repairs. For instance, many chiefdoms in 
the post-war period have been granted ‘dry floors’, as part of the establishment of Agricultural 
Business Centres (ABCs) supported by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). In order to 
use dry floors, farmers often have to use threshing machines at a fee (i.e. Le 3000, or US$0.69, 
or one bag of rice) in order to have a common fund for necessary repairs to the dry floor. In other 
cases, communities may levy taxes for repairs on a post-hoc basis. Additionally, sub-chiefdom 
sections often charge community-based user fees for use of water wells, often 2000 leones 
                                                        
12  Authors’ interview with Kamara Paramount Chief. 
13  This compulsory labour for private gain has deep historical roots: indeed, domestic slavery was commonplace until the early 
twentieth century, with chiefs frequently large slave owners. Compulsory labour was frequently a cause of dissent in the 
chiefdoms, but complaints by citizens were frequently ignored both by the colonial administration and the post-independence 
government (Acemoglu et al. 2013b).  
14  These bylaws, enacted by the chief or the Mammy Queen (depending on the gender of complainants), are unique to each 
chiefdom, though usually prohibit ‘cursing’, ‘thieving’ and ‘abusive’ behaviour. Authors’ focus group discussions and 
interviews in all nine chiefdoms. 
15  Authors’ focus group discussion, Upper Bambara Chiefdom.  
16  Authors’ focus group discussion, Upper Bambara Chiefdom. 
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(US$0.46) per household per month, in order to provide a ‘small incentive’ for ‘tap attendants’, 
and to provide a common reserve fund for when repairs or maintenance are required.17  
 
Finally, while local militias and informal community policing or security groups were pervasive 
during the war, our data makes clear the effectiveness of post-war demobilisation. During the 
war, neighbourhood watch groups made up of youths were common, while ‘Civil Defence Forces’ 
were key local institutions protecting fellow civilians from both the rebels and the Sierra Leonean 
army. Both types of security groups were often supported by local communities through ‘morale 
boosters’ or funding for the provision of batteries, petrol, food and logistics.18 Fourteen years 
after the war, less than 1 per cent of our respondents reported paying taxes to local militias or 
neighbourhood watch groups, while no respondents reported paying any taxes to gangs or other 
armed groups. That being said, many youth continue to perceive themselves as ‘guardians of 
society’, in some cases mobilising to settle small disputes, especially among other youth, or to 
support state security institutions (Baker 2005, 2008). In Gbane Chiefdom, for instance, a task 
force of young men assists the Sierra Leone Police and chiefdom police, with any individual 
seeking security assistance required to provide ‘a token’ or a ‘morale booster’ for the youth 
volunteers. As described within a focus group discussion with community members: ‘If you bring 
a problem to the police, you must stretch your hand to solve it.’ However, security groups that 
are not sanctioned by or working with the state are now very rare.  
 
 
5  Taxpayer perceptions of formal and informal 
taxation  
 
With this basic understanding of existing systems of formal and informal taxation, we now 
compare taxpayer perceptions of the different types of payments and actors. This analysis 
focuses on three key elements that may affect taxpayers’ experiences: (1) the fairness of the tax 
rate and distribution of the tax burden; (2) the relative coerciveness of enforcement methods; 
and (3) the accountability of revenues collected, the transparency of tax practices, and the 
overall fairness of the fiscal exchange.  
 
First, we examine taxpayer perspectives on three elements of fairness of taxation: tax rate; 
application and collection; and the distribution of the tax burden. As illustrated by Figure 4, 
taxpayers were more likely to perceive the rate of taxation to be too high for taxes levied by the 
government, while respondents were more likely to find levies by chiefs or non-state actors to be 
reasonable, with some taxpayers even willing to pay a higher rate for these payments. While 
formal state taxes and illegal state levies are perceived to have almost equally unfair rates, 
Table 3 shows that taxpayers perceive formal state taxes to be more fairly applied and collected 
and more evenly distributed amongst the taxpaying population than illegal levies. This seeming 
contradiction – that taxpayers perceive the rate of formal taxes to be unfair, yet find formal taxes 
to be fairly applied, collected and distributed – reflects nuanced responses amongst taxpayers, 
who in qualitative data collection often made clear distinctions between different aspects of the 
process of taxation. 
 
 
                                                        
17  Authors’ focus group discussions in Gbane, Gbense and Upper Bambara Chiefdoms.  
18  Initially admired for their selfless defence of civilians, when their power and numbers grew some Civil Defence Forces (CDF) 
units became less disciplined and began to abuse civilians and trade in diamonds alongside other fighters (Keen 2005: 268; 
Bellows and Miguel 2006; Baker 2005). Authors’ focus group discussions in Sulima and Mongo Chiefdoms. 
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Figure 4 Taxpayer perceptions of the fairness of the tax rate they pay, by tax type 
 
Note: For each tax they reported paying in the previous year, respondents were asked: ‘Is the rate you pay too high, reasonable, or 
would you be willing to pay a higher rate?’ ‘Informal non-state levies and user fees’ excludes payments made to religious 
organisations for community projects.   
 
 
Table 3 Taxpayer perceptions of the fairness of the application and collection of taxes 
and of the effective distribution of the tax burden 
 Formal state 
taxes and 
user fees 
Illegal state 
levies 
Informal 
chiefdom taxes 
and user fees 
Informal non-
state levies 
and user 
fees 
Mean percentage of respondents believing that the tax/es 
they pay is/are fairly applied and collected 
75.78% 
N 2267 
21.43% 
N 266 
60.42% 
N 576 
76.33% 
N 980 
Mean percentage of respondents believing that for the 
tax/es they pay everyone pays their fair share that should 
do so 
72.83% 
N 2267 
31.58% 
N 266 
60.76% 
N 576 
74.00% 
N 1673 
 
Note: For each tax they reported paying in the previous year, respondents were asked, ‘Is this tax fairly applied and collected?’ 
Possible options included, ‘No, the tax is arbitrarily levied’, ‘Yes, the tax is levied fairly’ or ‘Don’t know’. For each tax they reported 
paying in the previous year, respondents were asked, ‘Does everyone pay this tax that should do so?’ Possible responses included. 
‘No, not everyone pays their fair share’, ‘Yes, everyone pays their fair share’, or ‘Don’t know’. ‘Informal non-state levies and user fees’ 
excludes payments to religious organisations. 
 
However, as described in Table 4 and Figure 5, despite relatively positive taxpayer perceptions 
of the fairness of the distribution of the tax burden, we find that both formal and informal taxes 
are generally regressive, supporting previous research on informal and local government 
taxation (Olken and Singhal 2011; Van Damme 2012; Bahiigwa et al. 2004). This reflects the 
reality that most of these payments are collected as flat rate levies which are, by definition, 
regressive. At the same time, however, qualitative evidence suggests that political and economic 
connections often determine effective tax burdens within our case districts, negating or 
minimising the progressive impact of taxation where it may be possible; for instance, in Gbense 
Chiefdom, police collect local taxes, but are widely reported to issue exemptions that negatively 
affect the fair distribution of the tax.19   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19  Authors’ interviews, Kailahun District Council Chairman and Gbense Paramount Chief. 
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Table 4 Tax expenditure to income ratios, by tax type and income quintile 
Income quintile Total tax: income 
ratio 
Formal state tax 
expenditure: 
income ratio 
Illegal state levy 
expenditure: 
income ratio 
Informal chiefdom 
tax and user fee 
expenditure: 
income ratio 
Informal non-
state levy and 
user fee 
expenditure: 
income ratio 
First quintile 
(N 160) 
16.09% 7.92% 
 
0.86% 
 
0.41% 6.90% 
Second quintile 
(N 177) 
12.30% 7.01% 
 
0.22% 0.21% 4.86% 
Third quintile 
(N 162) 
16.99% 11.50% 
 
0.39% 0.14% 4.95% 
Fourth quintile 
(N 173) 
11.35% 6.83% 
 
0.61% 0.22% 3.68% 
Fifth quintile 
(N 176) 
7.09% 4.98% 
 
0.27% 0.11% 1.73% 
  
 
Figure 5 Tax payments as a proportion of income 
 
Second, we explore the enforcement mechanisms associated with the different types of 
payments and the degree to which they are coercive or rules-based. It may be expected that 
rules-based penalties (e.g. fines, goods confiscation, service denial and detainment) would be 
more associated with formal state taxes, while coercive penalties (e.g. verbal or physical 
harassment and social ostracism) would be more greatly associated with informal, non-statutory 
levies. However, on the whole, we find that both rules-based and coercive penalties are 
common outcomes of non-payment for both formal and informal payments in relatively rural and 
isolated areas, often with severe implications for livelihoods.  
 
On one end of the spectrum, certain rules-based enforcement approaches, including 
imprisonment and goods confiscation, are most associated with taxes levied by the state, though 
chiefs retain power to confiscate property and imprison local tax defaulters. While fines are 
relatively common across the different types of tax, we find that they are most associated with 
chiefdom tax enforcement, with these penalties often being relatively severe and thus widely 
perceived as an overwhelming deterrent to non-payment.20 Meanwhile, service denial is most 
associated with illegal state levies, reflecting that these taxes are often transactional, based on a 
                                                        
20  Bylaws in Mongo Chiefdom effectively ensure that parents pay community school fees by levying a Le 500,000 (US$115.50) 
fine for withdrawing students from school. Authors’ focus group discussions and interviews in Mongo, Gbense and Gbane 
Chiefdoms.  
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need to expedite a public service or to simply cross a roadblock without being turned away. 
Service denial for formal state taxes is also common: for instance, some districts require 
taxpayers to show their local tax receipts in order to open a business, obtain a mining licence, 
get a job in the formal sector or go to court.21 However, service denial may be a particularly 
severe outcome for informal chiefdom and non-state payments – for instance, by preventing 
defaulters from using common water sources or other public goods – though we find that the 
likelihood and severity of service denial enforcement is highly dependent on the relative power 
of the chief, with chiefs in more remote areas generally more able to wield more substantial 
penalties. Informal non-state levies are also closely associated with impunity for non-payment, 
which may again suggest a degree of pragmatic adaptability to local contexts: for instance, 
certain chiefdom and school leaders noted that while they try to ‘encourage’ parents to pay 
community teacher fees, they do not turn students away that are unable to pay, as school 
enrolment would be adversely affected. 
 
Figure 6 Perceived consequences of non-payment 
 
Note: For each tax they reported paying in the previous year, respondents were asked, ‘How likely do you think it is that the following 
actions would be taken against you for non-payment of this tax/payment?’ Possible responses included: ‘Unlikely,’ ‘Neither likely nor 
unlikely,’ ‘Likely’ or ‘Don’t know’.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, verbal and physical harassment are relatively common forms 
of penalisation for non-payment, with particularly high rates of harassment associated with illegal 
state levies and chiefdom taxes. Indeed, focus group participants and chiefdom interviewees 
reported that violating chiefdom bylaws can result in being ‘tied to a post and harassed’ by 
community members. However, interviewees also described significant levels of harassment 
associated with formal state taxes, including with respect to local tax collection. For instance, in 
Gbane and Gbense Chiefdoms, community members and chiefdom leaders described local tax 
being collected ‘by force’ at the hands of the Native Authority or district police at roadblocks, 
leading some taxpayers to pin their local tax receipt to their shirts in order to avoid harassment 
on the street.22 Finally, social ostracism or peer pressure is an important form of penalisation 
across all forms of taxation, though these are most associated with chiefdom taxes. Indeed, we 
heard extensive evidence of public shaming and humiliation as a result of violating chiefdom 
bylaws, including parading bylaw violators or defaulters through town naked or making them 
‘dance around the town’.23 Often a particularly severe form of penalisation in these contexts is 
                                                        
21  As this is often viewed as a transactional necessity, further problems are created related to the timing of local tax payment. 
In some of the chiefdoms we visited in November, tax receipt books had still not been distributed for the calendar year, with 
taxpayers expressing that they would be unwilling to pay so late in the year as the receipt would only be ‘useful’ for a short 
period. Authors’ focus group discussions in Luawa and Upper Bambara Chiefdoms, and interviews with Town Chief in Luawa 
Chiefdom and Kailahun District Council Chairman. 
22  Authors’ focus group discussion, Gbane Chiefdom, and interviews with Paramount and Section Chiefs in Gbense Chiefdom.  
23  Authors’ focus group discussions, Gbane, Kasunko and Kamara Chiefdoms.  
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what was described as ‘abandonment’ in times of crises: ‘If you don’t pay and need help, we will 
not come to your aid.’24  
 
Finally, we explore taxpayer perceptions of three aspects of tax governance, including the 
existence or absence of a reciprocal fiscal exchange, the accountability of taxing authorities and 
the transparency of tax practices. First, when asked what they receive in return for paying taxes, 
respondents were more likely to report receiving a specific good or service in exchange for 
paying informal non-state or chiefdom taxes and levies relative to formal state taxes (Figure 7). 
This may seem intuitively unsurprising given that many of the payments made to chiefs and non-
state actors are more akin to user fees in exchange for a particular service or benefit, while 
revenues collected by the local and central government (e.g. income tax, local/poll tax, property 
tax) are more akin to the conventional notion of a tax as contributing to a general source of 
revenue for the state. However, this distinction may be less pronounced in practice. Indeed, 
while payments to non-state actors may generally be considered user fees, many payments 
made to chiefs are not directly related to a service or good, but may rather contribute to the 
reciprocal relations that define the chief’s authority, with the chief offering social protection in 
times of need. At the same time, few taxpayers pay income and property tax within the case 
chiefdoms, while the majority of local government revenues in these areas are made up of what 
may be more commonly considered user fees (e.g. market fees, business operating licences, 
user fees for government services).  
 
More interesting, however, is the impact that the payment of fees to non-state actors and chiefs 
seems to have on the willingness of taxpayers to pay formal government taxes. Qualitative 
evidence suggests tentatively that taxpayers may see any type of payment, including direct 
payments for services, as obviating their duty to pay general taxes to the government. Indeed, 
the lack of a clear link between government taxes, services or development has led to resistance 
to the local/poll tax payment in some areas.25 As described by a taxpayer in Mandu Chiefdom, 
people are ‘less willing to pay local [poll] tax when they’re paying on their own’ for services, such 
as through community development taxes. These feelings of a lack of reciprocity have 
implications for how taxpayers view the newly introduced property rate, with many communities 
asking why they should pay a new tax to the district council when they have not yet seen the 
benefits of local tax.26 As described by a community leader in Upper Bambara Chiefdom: ‘They 
[the District Council] say it [property tax] is for development, but we don’t see it [development] 
and don’t know why we should pay more. We haven’t seen the benefit from local tax, so we will 
resist [property tax collection].’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
24  Authors’ interview with ward councillor, Kasunko Chiefdom.  
25  Authors’ interview with Paramount Chief of Gbense, and focus group discussions in Luawa and Mandu Chiefdom. 
26  Authors’ focus group discussions in Gbane Chiefdom and interview with Paramount Chief of Gbense.  
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Figure 7 Fiscal exchange and perceptions of reciprocity 
Likewise, we find that taxpayers believe that informal non-state and chiefdom taxes and levies 
are more likely than formal state taxes to be used to benefit the community some or most of the 
time (Figure 8). This perspective is, unsurprisingly, attenuated for user fees levied by the local 
government.  
 
Figure 8 Taxpayer perceptions of the accountability of the tax levying authority 
 
In terms of rate setting and of information about how revenues from taxes are spent, informal 
non-state levies are perceived by taxpayers to be the most transparent of taxes, with informal 
chiefdom taxes viewed more positively than formal state taxes (Table 5). Taxpayers repeatedly 
cited a lack of information about local, market and property taxes: for instance, in some 
chiefdoms taxpayers conflated local tax and property rate, questioning why the district council is 
asking them to ‘pay twice’; in other chiefdoms, taxpayers understood the property rate as a ‘rent’ 
rather than a tax, questioning why they should pay rent on the houses they rebuilt after the war 
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without government support.27 By contrast, taxpayers repeatedly reported that everyone in their 
respective communities knows about chiefdom bylaws and taxes levied by community groups: 
for instance, it is well known that if an outside group brings a development project to the 
chiefdom, chiefdom subjects are responsible for providing local materials and labour.28  
 
Table 5 Taxpayer understanding of rate setting and of how tax revenues are spent 
 Formal state taxes and 
user fees 
Illegal state levies Informal 
chiefdom taxes 
and user fees 
Informal non-state 
levies and user fees 
Mean percentage of 
respondents reporting that 
they understand how the tax 
rate/s they pay is/are set  
10.45% 
N 2267 
4.14% 
N 266 
20.60% 
N 183 
45.02% 
N 642 
Mean percentage of 
respondents reporting that it 
is easy to find out how tax 
revenues are used 
6.93% 
N 2267 
4.14% 
N 266 
10.93% 
N 183 
52.24% 
N 1673 
 
Note: For each tax they reported paying in the previous year, respondents were asked, ‘Do you understand how the rate that you 
pay is determined?’ Possible options included, ‘No’, ’Yes’ or ‘Don’t know’. For each tax they reported paying in the previous year, 
respondents were asked, ‘Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to find out how the revenues from this tax are used?’ 
Possible options included, ‘Easy’, ‘Neither easy nor difficult’, ’Difficult’ or ’Don’t know’. Figures in column 3, ‘Informal chiefdom taxes 
and user fees’, exclude labour payments to chief. Figure in column 4, line 1 excludes payments to religious organisations, and 
informal user fees.  
 
 
 
6  Discussion and policy implications  
 
Table 6 summarises taxpayer perceptions of the four types of payments examined in this study; 
we highlight five key findings. First, informal taxation, including payments levied by non-state 
actors, is a prevalent reality in rural areas of conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Second, informal 
non-state and chiefdom taxes and levies are more positively perceived across a wide range of 
indicators relative to taxes levied by the state, with informal non-state levies perceived to be the 
most fair, reciprocal, transparent and accountable of all taxes. This seems to indicate relatively 
effective and consensual forms of informal revenue collection and service delivery at community 
levels in the absence of effective state service delivery. Third, while informal chiefdom taxes are 
perceived more positively than state taxes across a range of indicators, it is also the case that 
chiefdom taxes are perceived to be relatively unaccountable and lacking in transparency. Chiefs’ 
demands for labour or construction materials can often be seen as exploitative (Fanthorpe 2004; 
Richards 2005), while the ‘overall lack of transparency in chiefdom financial administration 
undermines the development of any social contract between decentralized service providers and 
local taxpayers’ (Fanthorpe et al. 2011: 58). Indeed, a significant literature documents a degree 
of popular unhappiness with many chiefs in the country (Mamdani 1996; Richards, Bah and 
Vincent 2004; Fanthorpe and Gibril Sesay 2009), with some indications that these perceptions 
have led to tax resistance at the local level (Prichard and Jibao 2010). Fourth, formal state taxes 
levied by the central or local government perform quite poorly across our range of indicators, 
though illegal state levies are the overall worst performers, which is perhaps unsurprising given 
the degree of coercion associated with these forms of taxation. Nevertheless, taxpayer 
perceptions are relatively nuanced: for instance, while taxpayers view the rates for formal state 
taxes to be too high, they believe they are fairly applied and distributed. Finally, there are some 
consistencies across types of tax. For instance, all types of taxes prove to be regressive, 
regardless of taxpayer perceptions of the fairness of the distribution. Moreover, all types of tax 
                                                        
27  Authors’ focus group discussions and interviews in Gbane, Gbense, Kamara, Upper Bambara and Mandu Chiefdoms.  
28  Authors’ focus group discussions, Mongo, Gbense and Mandu Chiefdoms. 
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include both rules-based and coercive forms of enforcement, though the balance of these 
mechanisms does not appear to affect overall perceptions of the fairness of how the taxes are 
applied.  
 
Table 6 Summary of taxpayer perceptions 
 Formal state taxes and 
user fees 
Illegal state levies Informal chiefdom 
taxes and user 
fees 
Informal non-state 
levies and user fees 
Fairness of tax rate Negative perceptions of 
tax rate 
Negative perceptions 
of tax rate 
Positive perceptions 
of tax rate 
Positive perceptions 
of tax rate 
Fairness of distribution  Fairly distributed Unfairly distributed Mostly fairly 
distributed 
Fairly distributed 
Fairness of 
application/collection  
Fairly applied Arbitrarily applied Mostly fairly applied Fairly applied 
Tax expenditure to income Regressive Regressive Regressive Regressive 
Coerciveness of 
enforcement (top 3) 
(1) A fine would be 
levied, (2) service would 
be denied, (3) verbal 
harassment would be 
likely 
(1) A fine would be 
levied, (2) service 
would be denied, (3) 
verbal harassment 
would be likely 
(1) A fine would be 
levied, (2) verbal 
harassment would 
be likely, (3) service 
would be denied 
(1) Service would be 
denied, (2) no 
penalty, (3) physical 
harassment 
Reciprocity  Low levels of reciprocity Low levels of 
reciprocity 
High levels of 
reciprocity 
High levels of 
reciprocity 
Transparency of rate setting  Not transparent Not transparent More transparent More transparent 
Transparency of 
expenditures 
Not transparent Not transparent Not transparent Transparent 
Accountability of taxing 
authority 
Not accountable Not accountable Not accountable Accountable 
 
These key findings, as well as the more general institutionalisation of many informal forms of 
taxation, point to several key implications for how we think about taxation in rural areas of Sierra 
Leone. First, and most basically, our research shows that informal taxes and levies are a 
prevalent and institutionalised reality within rural areas of Sierra Leone. While informal revenues 
may be relatively small in absolute terms, they represent significant proportions of taxpayer 
income, with rural citizens often paying a greater number of informal levies than formal taxes. 
Given the significance of informal levies at the local level, widening the analytical lens to capture 
the full range of payments made by citizens is necessary for understanding ‘real’ tax and 
governance systems, as well as rural poverty and livelihoods.  
 
Second, our finding of positive taxpayer perceptions of informal non-state levies raises questions 
about service delivery models in rural areas in the aftermath of conflict. Relatively positive 
taxpayer perceptions of the ‘reciprocity’ of both informal chiefdom and non-state levies suggest 
some advantages to community-driven development models, which have recently received 
considerable attention from donors (e.g. Casey, Glennerster and Miguel 2011). However, there 
are risks associated with strengthening local institutions, which may be unaccountable or 
unrepresentative. Indeed, there is a well-documented risk that community-based informal 
revenue collection mechanisms favour certain groups or serve to reproduce inequalities of 
power (Cleaver et al. 2013; Meagher 2013; CFS 2010; Joshi and Moore 2004; Guha-Khasnobis, 
Kanbur and Ostrom 2006), while in Sierra Leone there is a risk that chiefs may capture 
community-driven development models (Acemoglu et al. 2013b). More fundamentally, there may 
be long-term risks of privatising service delivery through a mechanism parallel to the state, in a 
manner that does not serve to strengthen the underlying relationship between the taxpayer and 
the state. For instance, Bodea and LeBas (2013) argue that groups that are comparatively able 
to rely on community provision of essential services through ‘self-help’ projects may be less 
supportive of taxation, raising questions for the long-term implications of relying on non-state 
service delivery mechanisms. Despite these tensions, our research suggests a potentially 
positive role for community-based taxation and service delivery in the absence of state presence, 
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highlighting an area for further research: how best to manage the risks associated with 
alternative forms of taxation and service delivery in post-conflict areas.  
 
At the same time, however, the meaning and implications of low levels of trust in local 
government remain ambiguous. On the one hand, taxpayers may trust chiefdom and non-state 
taxing authorities because they are more effective in delivering services, reflecting broader 
evidence in sub-Saharan Africa of low levels of confidence and trust in local government 
(Bratton 2012; Logan 2009). On the other hand, taxpayers may express greater trust in and 
more positive perceptions of informal taxes simply because they more closely resemble user 
fees; this is particularly true for some of the taxes levied by non-state groups, such as parents’ 
groups collecting fees for teachers’ salaries. This perspective is supported by the reality that 
taxpayers report more positive perceptions of local government user fees than other taxes. This 
is an important distinction that calls for further research; however, if the latter proposition is the 
case, it still has important implications for thinking about appropriate models of revenue 
collection and service delivery at the local level by the formal state.  
 
Third, our findings reinforce the reality that local councils are highly dependent on chiefs for tax 
collection and taxpayer cooperation, with chiefs remaining very powerful in this domain. Chiefs 
have enormous power to either help or hinder district councils in tax collection, while it is clear 
that chiefs are more trusted than the central state, but still distrusted in many ways. On the one 
hand, citizens may view chiefdom tax collection as unaccountable. On the other hand, they are 
also likely to be heavily invested in patronage networks that have paramount chiefs at their apex, 
as well as to believe that they have greater influence over local institutions than they do over the 
central state, resulting in little popular desire for significant reform of the current system 
(Acemoglu et al. 2013b; Acemoglu, Chaves, Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson 2013; Sawyer 2008; 
Fanthorpe 2004 and 2005). These empirical insights contribute to a broader discussion about 
the need to find institutional strategies that recognise the reality of chiefs’ prominence, yet 
without giving carte blanche for chiefly unaccountability.29  
 
Finally, given poor taxpayer perceptions of formal state taxes, our findings imply a basic need to 
increase taxpayer confidence in the formal tax system. Our evidence suggests that taxpayers 
overwhelmingly believe that they get nothing from the local government for their taxes, 
suggesting a need to think about strategies for addressing this, including basic things like 
providing tangible benefits from local tax revenue, and increasing the transparency and 
accountability of the system. Evidence from research implemented by Jibao and Prichard (2013) 
within city councils in Sierra Leone implies that the use of more explicit transparency 
mechanisms can be significant to taxpayer perceptions of the accountability of local government. 
In any case, decentralisation in Sierra Leone cannot succeed in the absence of a local tax 
system that generates revenue in a way that enjoys a degree of popular legitimacy (Jackson 
2005; Robinson 2008; Fanthorpe et al. 2011). More broadly, the relationship between informal 
revenue collection and compliance with formal taxes remains uncertain, highlighting an area for 
deeper exploration by further research. Extensive informal revenue collection may be viewed as 
conscious citizen exit from the state, as missed opportunities for state building, and as lost 
                                                        
29  At the most basic level, mechanisms of downward accountability within chiefly institutions could counteract some of the 
negative aspects of informal chiefdom taxes, while rectifying some of the key elements of accountability that were removed 
from indigenous political institutions during indirect rule and after independence (Ashton 1947; Gluckman, Mitchell and 
Barnes 1949; Crowder and Ikime 1970; Migdal 1988; Mamdani 1996). As described by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 342), 
indirect rule ‘introduced a system of social stratification – the ruling houses – where none had existed previously. A 
hereditary aristocracy replaced a situation that had been much more fluid and where chiefs had required popular support. 
Instead, what emerged was a rigid system with chiefs holding office for life, beholden to their patrons in Freetown or Britain, 
and far less accountable to the people they ruled.’ 
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revenue for the state. At the same time, however, it is not always the case that citizens paying 
informal taxes refuse to pay formal taxes. Indeed, informal tax may simply be serving as an 
alternative to a largely absent formal state, or a means for citizens to circumvent coercive or 
unaccountable state apparatuses.  
 
 
7  Conclusions 
 
This paper has explored informal forms of taxation by state and non-state actors in rural, highly 
conflict-affected and isolated districts of Sierra Leone in order to better understand the reality of 
local tax burdens, public goods provision and governance. Informal taxation in rural and conflict-
affected regions is an area in which little research has previously been conducted. As such, this 
research is exploratory, aimed not at generating universal messages, but at contributing to the 
discussion of ‘real’ tax, service delivery and governance systems in the absence of a strong 
state. The conclusions drawn here thus offer a set of possibilities for further exploration. 
 
Our findings highlight several broad messages: informal taxation, particularly that conducted by 
non-state community-based groups and chiefdom authorities, is a prominent reality within rural 
Sierra Leone, while being more positively perceived by taxpayers relative to taxes levied by the 
central or local state in terms of fairness, reciprocity, and accountability. However, while informal 
chiefdom taxes are on the whole more positively perceived than formal state taxes, they are also 
perceived to be relatively unaccountable and lacking in transparency. These findings raise a 
number of additional questions that are being addressed by follow-up research in the chiefdoms 
within which the survey was undertaken. Notably, this research will explore to a greater extent 
the implications of the role of non-state taxation for formal local institutional development and 
state building more broadly. How do these non-state actors engage with the formal state, does 
the nature of this engagement vary across regions, and how should we think about their role and 
relationship to the state from a long-term developmental and state-building perspective? What 
are the implications of these relationships and service provision roles in the wake of the Ebola 
crisis? By raising these questions, this initial research makes clear that taking the full ranges of 
taxes, levies, and fees paid by citizens into account has important implications for how we think 
about taxation, public service delivery and governance in rural areas of a conflict-affected 
country. The prevalence and institutionalisation of informal revenue collection at the local level 
highlights the importance of widening the analytical lens in order to capture the full range of 
payments made by citizens, and to accurately capture and assess models of taxation and 
service delivery in areas of weak formal statehood.  
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